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NONVOTING COMMON STOCK: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITIONS
T o MEET the needs of .the business community in the 192O's, a virtually
new device, nonvoting common stock, was introduced into the realm
of corporate finance. The principal utility of this innovation has been
that, while providing for corporate expansion and financial flexibility,
it also allows retention of voting control within a select class of stock-
holders.' A few courts, however, have refused to recognize the validity
of this device, despite enabling legislation, because of state constitutional
provisions which have been construed so as to prohibit the issuance of
nonvoting stock.
Illustrative of this approach is State ex rel. Dewey Portland Cement
Com'pany v. O'Briem.a There, -in order to permit an increase in:.its
authorized capital, a cement company sought a charter amendment di-
viding a proposed new stock issue into two. classes: class A common 4ad
class B common, with voting rights vested only in the latter. The Secre-
tary of State of West Virginia declined to certify the desired modifica-
tion, and the Supreme Court of Appeals subsequently refused to issue
a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to act, concluding that in so
far as the Constitution of West Virginia guaranteed to every stockholder
'Three reasons have been suggested for the increased utilization of classified com-
mon stock: (i) investor-speculator's demand for a share in the bounteous profits being
reaped by industry during this period; (2) desire of management to acquire additional
capital while at the same time retaining full control of the corporations (3) desire
of bankers and promoters to have something new to offer to the public. i DEWINc,
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS x65 (4 th ed. 194.), Dewing, The Developmaent
of Class A4 and Class B Stocks, 5 HAny. Bus. REV. 332 (x927)." See General In-
vestment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N.J. Eq. 234, ioo At. 347 (xx). Cf.
Warren v. Pim, 66 N.J. Eq. 353, 59 Adt. 773 (1904).
' In the absence of conflicting constitutional and statutory provisions, nonvoting
stock was early recognized. See In re Barrow Haematite Steel Co., 39 Ch. D. 582
(z888). Perhaps the first American case actually to deal with the legality of nonvoting
stock was Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 157, 24 N.E. 496, 500 (x889). The
court there said: "The promise to the preferred stockholders was to award them the
first net earnings, the holders of the common stock to share in such of the net earnings
as they might, by good management, be able to make over and above the 8 percent."
a 96 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1957).
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the right to vote in the election of directors, including the right to vote
cumulatively, the issuance of stock stripped of voting rights could not be
tolerated.
The language of the West Virginia Constitution,4 considered alone,
would perhaps support the court's decision. Furthermore, in Illinois5
and Delaware," under identical or similar provisions, the courts have
likewise held that every stockholder is guaranteed an unqualifiable right
to vote all stock registered in his name. The Missouri Supreme Court,
on the other hand, has interpreted an analogous constitutional provision
simply to protect those stockholders who by corporate charter are en-
titled to vote in the election of directors against manipulations which
might deprive a minority of a voice in the corporation's affairs.7 Indeed,
'W. VA. CoNsr. art. XI, § 4 (1872) provides as follows: "The Legislature shall
provide by law that in all elections for directors or managers of incorporated com-
panies, every stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person or by proxy, for the
numbers of shares of stock owned by him, for as many persons as there are directors or
managers to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many
votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock, shall
equal, or to distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates as he
shall think fit: and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other man-
ner." See Note, 40 W. VA. L. Rrv. 97 (1934). Adopted in 1872, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has considered this section but twice prior to the instant case.
Germer v. Triple-State Natural Gas and Oil Co., 6o W. Va. 143, 54 S.E. 509 (19o6);
Cross v. W. Virginia Cent. and Pa. R. Co., 35 W. Va. 174, 12 S.E. 1072 (1891). In
both cases it was held that a corporation could not deprive a stockholder of the right
to vote cumulatively in the election of directors.
5 ILL. CoNs'r. art. XI, § 3 (1870). In State ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v.
Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922) the court denied mandamus to enforce
issuance of a corporate charter by the Secretary of State because the proposed preferred
stock denied the stockholder the right to vote. It was held that the words declare the
meaning of the constitution, and neither the courts nor the legislatures have the right
to add to or take away from that meaning. It is perhaps significant that Illinois had
no statute authorizing nonvoting stock, and legislative construction of a constitution
carries considerable weight in interpreting its provisions. See Comment, Corporations--
Stockholders-Votling Powers-Preferred Stock--Constitutional Law. 17 ILL. L. REv.
238 (923). Cf. Durkee v. People ex rel. Askren, 155 Ill. 354, 40 N.E. 626 (x855);
Wright v. Central Calif. Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (x885).
DEL. CONST. art. 9, § 6 (897). Delaware had a statute analogous to that of
West Virginia which permitted the issuance of nonvoting stock. DE.L. LAWs C. 273,
§ 20 (1889). In Brooks v. State, 3 Boyce 1, 79 At. 790 (Del. 1911), the court,
in construing the constitutional provision held that the statute authorizing nonvoting
stock was unconstitutional and all issues of stock thereunder invalid. In 2903, however,
prior to this decision, Delaware had repealed the constitutional provision in question.
See DEL. LAWS c. 254, § 2 (2903).
1 Mo. CoNsT'. art. x2, § 6 (1875). In State ex rel. Frank v. Swanger, 19o Mo.
56r, 89 S.W. 872 (19o5), the court stated: "We hold that the evident purpose of
section 6, art. 12, of our Congtitution was the guaranty to stockholders having the right
19s8] NOTES
this was apparently the interpretation that the West Virginia legislature
placed on its own governing constitutional provision when it enacted
its statute8 sanctioning nonvoting stock.
At common law, it was well settled that absent a charter provision
to vote of cumulating their votes, and has no reference to the contractual right of the
stockholders inter sese of providing that preferred stockholders shall or shall not have
the right to vote such stock, and to hold that it has taken away this well-recognized
common-law right would be to distort its obvious purpose." Although the Swnger
case dealt with nonvoting preferred stock, presumably, the above quoted language would
also apply to nonvoting common stock should the question of its validity ever arise.
8W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3034, 3078 (x949). As early as 1864 West Virginia
enacted a statute providing that stockholders of any corporation may provide for the
issue of preferred stock, upon such terms and conditions, and with such stipulations
and regulations respecting preferences as they may see fit to precribe. W. VA. AcTs c.
43, § (1864). This was the same statute that was in force when art. XI, § 4 of the
Constitution was adopted in 1872. In 1873, one year after the enactment of the
Constitution, the legislature provided that in all elections of directors, every stock-
holder shall have the right to vote for the number of shares of stock owned by him
for as many persons as there are "directors to be elected, or to cumulate said shares.
W. VA. Acms c. 1S, § 44 (1872-73). This same provision was re-enacted without
substantial change in ig. W. VJ. Acm c. x7, § 56 (xssx). In 1882, the general
corporation law was enacted which included the provisions of W. VA. Acm c. 43,
§ 1 (1864) and c. ,7, § s6 (sg8x). W. VA. Acrs c. 96, § i6 and § 44 (,8s-).
The present W. Va. Code Ann. § 3034 (x949) follows substantially the language of
W. VA. ACmS c. 96, § x6 (x88a), and W. Va. Code Ann. § 3078 (1949) follows
substantially the language of W. VA. Acrs c. 96, § 44 (1882).
*1 REPORT OF THE CODE REvmsos OF WEST VIRGINIA 10 (1931): "The weight
of modern judicial opinion seems to hold such a provision unconstitutional, but these
decisions, while well reasoned in many respects, seem to ignore the flexibility of a state
constitution to meet changing public conditions, and for this reason do not seem to
give as much weight as we think should be given to the real purpose of the provision,
which was to secure the right of cumulative voting. .. . Attention is also called to
the fact that the constitutional provision referred to relates only to voting for directors,
and does not relate to the right to vote on other corporate acts." But see Note, 40
W. VA. L. REV. 97 (x933) wherein Melvin G. Sperry, Chairman of the Code Com-
mission of 1gzx states: "We studied with considerable misgiving the well-reasoned
cases of the People v. Emmerson, [302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922)] decided by the
Supreme Court of Illinois in 1922; Brooks v. The State, [3 Boyce :, 79 Atl. 790
(Del.' 291x)] decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware in x911; and Randle v.
Winona Coal Company, [±o6 Ala. 315, 89 So. 790 (i9±1)] decided by the Supreme
Court of Alabama in x92i. [These courts] answered in the negative every proposi-
tion which was or apparently could be asserted in favor of the constitutionality of
legislative action of the respective states similar to the West Virginia act of 19o,
in the face of the constitutional inhibition in the state of Illinois identical, and in the
state of Delaware almost identical, with the provision of West Virginia. The courts
of those states were not influenced by an [sic] business consideration, or obligation
to prevent confusion in business affairs, or by any question of public policy. Indeed,
they held that in the matter of public policy the rule clearly favored the right to give
to every shareholder of a corporation one vote for each share of stock held."
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to the contrary, each stockholder was entitled to only one vote; without
regard to the number of shares he held.10 The obvious inequity of this
method of voting was early recognized, however, and each stockholder
was soon legislatively assured a specific number of votes based
upon a decreasing proportional ratio to the number of shares he held
in the corporation."' But in. most jurisdictions, these safeguards
were subsequently eroded by statutory provisions which entitled each
stockholder to one vote for each share, thus enabling a majority bloc to
exclude entirely the minority from representation. 2 A resulting fear of
abuse led to the introduction of cumulative voting.1 8 Viewed in this
"Commonwealth v. Conover, io Phila. 55 (1873); Taylor v. Griswold, a Green
222 (N.J. 1834); In re Horbury Bridge Coal, Iron and Wagon Co., xx Ch. D. 1o9
(1879). In Luthy v. Ream, 270 IM. 170, x8i, 11o N.E. 373, 377 (xgxs) it was held
that: ... the power to vote is inherently attached to and inseparable from the real
ownership of each share.... " See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA oF CoRPoRATIoNs, §§ 2o2S,
2045 (per=n ed. x952); Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations
Before z8oo, 2 HARv. L. REv. xos, x56 (1888). Cf. Tracy v. Brentwood Village
Corp. 3o Del. Ch. 296, 59 A.zd 708 (1948); McLain v. Lanova Corp., a8 Del.
Ch. 176, 39 A.zd 2o9. (x944); In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32, 21
A.ad 697 (1941).
"
1 The Virginia statutes which first set forth the ratio of votes to the number of
shares held by the stockholder, varied the ratio and made it dependent upon the
catagorization of the corporation. For example, in manufacturing and mining corpord"
tions, the ratio was one vote for every share up to fifteen shares; one additional vote
for every five shares from fifteen shares up to one hundred shares; and one additional
vote for every twenty shares over one hundred shares. VA. ACTs c. 84, § 5 (1837).
In 1849, title xi of the Code of Virginia was enacted to cover all chartered corpora-
tions and, for the first time, standardize to a degree, the ratio of votes to the number
of shares held by the stockholder. CODE OF VA. tit. 1S, c. 57, § 10 (1849).
"Mo. LAWS, COaR., § 3 (1849) provided that: "All elections shall be by ballot,
and each stockholder shall be entitled to as many votes as he owns shares of stock in
the said company... .' Gregg v. Granby Mining and Smelting Co., x64 Mo. 6x6,
625, 65 S.W. 312, 313 (0go1): "It was evidently the purpose of our legislature t6
settle this question [of a stockholder's voting rights] by a positive enactment.... Thus,
the share is made the unit of election, and not the person who owns it, regardless of
the number of his shares."
Dl. LAWS, c. 273, § 20 (1899) provided that: "A. stockholder shall be entitled
to one vote for each share of stock he may hold [in the corporation]."
ILL. LAWS, CoR., § 3 (8s59) provided that: "At such meeting stockholders may
vote, either in person or by proxy, one vote for each share of stock held and thus
represented."
"See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OFr CORRATIONS, § 2048 (perm. ed. 1952);
BALLANTINF, CORPORATIONS 404, § 177 (rev. ed. 1946). For the mechanical aspects
of cumulative voting see WIx.LiAmes, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 40-46
(195i). For argumenti for and against the cumulative method of voting see Young,
The Care for Cuamdathe Voting, Wis. L. REv. 49 (195o); Axley, The Case Against
Cumulative Voting; Wis. L. R~v. 278 (1950).
perspective, the West Virginia constitutional provision was apparently
designed solely to insure representation to minority voters.
Yet, it is arguably anomalous thus to assure representation to mnori-
ties, but to deny it to nonvoting stockholders who, in fact, may repre-
sent a majority of the corporate investors. In this connection, even those
jurisdictions that recognize the validity of nonvoting stock, in the face
of similar constitutional impediments, have limited their sanction to non-
voting preferred stock, reasoning that preferred stockholders are other-
wise protected by law or agreement and, therefore, do not need repre-
sentation as a protective measure.14
Admittedly, nonvoting stock does not conduce the promotion of in-
tracorporate democracy, but in reality, it would seem that this short-
coming is largely academic. The growth of corporations and the wide-
spread dispersion of stock ownership have combined to reduce true
stockholder democracy to an unattainable ideal.15 Illustrative of this
thesis is the proxy, which, although originally designed to extend repre-
sentation to the absent stockhglder, has become one of the principal in-
struments not by which corporate democracy is sustained, but by which
the right to representation is usually delegated to representatives of the
control group 1
"State ex rtel. Frank v. Swanger, i9o Mo. 561, 89 S.W. 872 (x9oS)3 American
Railway-Frog Co. v. Haven, tox Mass. 398 (1869) i State ex tel. Danforh v. Hunton,
28 Vt. 594 (x856). GTHMAN & DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 91 (2d
ed. 1948) x DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 163 (4th ed. 1941).
'BERLE AND MEAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 138
(1932). For a discussion of the status of stockholder democracy today, see EMERSON
AND LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORA-MONS
('954).
"Grantz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 195), cert, denied, 341 U.S. 920
.(195x) ; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. SEC, x27 F.2d 378 (gth Cir. 1942), 139 F.2d 298
(9th Cir. 94 af3' , 324 U.S. 826 (x944) (17.71% of stock as controlling in-
terest); American Gas & Electric Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 633 (App. D.C. 1943), cert.
dnied, 319 U.S. 763 (1943) (17.5% as controlling interest) ; Detroit Edison Co.
v. SEC, 119 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1941), cert, denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941) (19.2%
as controlling interest) i Rochester Tel. Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939), 39
COLuM. L. REV. 295 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937)
(33.33% as controlling interest); Koppers United Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 577 (App.
D.C. 1943) (14.59% as controlli g interest); Morgan Stanley & Co. v. SEC, 126 F.2d
325 (2d Cir. 1942); BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORAT7ON AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 82 (1932) (14.9% given as controlling interest in Standard Oil Company).
See Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 7-13, 458 (i95s); Timberg, Corporaie Fictions-
Logical, Socil and Interaional Implications, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 533, 561 (1946).
Cf. Comments, Interpretation of "Holding Company" an Aj fffiate Under the Public
Utility Holdiffg Company Act, si YALE LJ. ioz8 (1942); Holding Company Act-
"Controlling Influence," 40 MICH. L.REV. 274 (1941).
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Is the right to vote in ordinary managerial matters, then, a right all
stockholders must possess in order to insure adequate individual in-
vestor protection?17 Nonvoting stock vests management in a select class
of shares, but it does not exclude the nonvoting shareholder from exer-
cising all of the perogatives of corporate ownership. For example, in-
uring to every stockholder are, by virtue of numerous statutes and de-
cisions, the right to vote upon the propriety of a dissolution or of a sale
of all the assets and a voice in matters affecting the ratio of voting to
nonvoting stock, as well as in matters concerning the surrender of the
corporate charter.18  Further, although judicial policy has tended to
"There is substantial authority for answering this question in the affirmative.
Since 1926, the New York Stock Exchange has refused to list nonvoting common stock,
and since 1940, certain preferred stock, the voting rights of which have been sub-
stantially curtailed. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 488 (5951). Similarly, the SEC
may not authorize the sale of a security of a registered utility unless such security is a
common stock having at least equal voting rights with any outstanding security of
the declarant. Public Utility Holding Company Act, 1935, 49 STAT. 815, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79g(c) (1) (1952). The Federal Bankruptcy Act requires that plans of reorganiza-
tion must include provisions prohibiting the reorganized company from issuing non-
voting stock. Bankruptcy Act, 1898, 52 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 6x6(za) (a)
(.952).
"' For example, N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW, § IoS. All stock, voting and non-voting
shall be considered voting for purposes of dissolution unless there is an express pro-
vision to the contrary in the charter. But, when a sale of all the assets is proposed,
only those stockholders entitled to vote may vote. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW, § 2o.
Accord, N.J. STAT. ANN., § 14.13-1 (1939). Mo. REV. STAT. ANN., § 35I,090
(1949), provides, in case a charter amendment would adversely affect issued and out-
standing nonvoting stock, then the vote of such nonvoting stock must be taken before
the amendment can be made.
Some states, however, make no distinction between voting and nonvoting stock,
the effect of which is to exclude nonvoting stock from voting on such matters. W. VA.
CODE ANN., §§ 3076, 3093 (1949) ; ILL. STAT. ANN., §§ 32.074, 32.o76 (Jones, 1934 ) ;
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §§ 271, 275 (1953).
The leading decision is generally considered to be Abbott v. American Hard Rub-
ber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y. 1861). The common law rule is that a corporation
has no power to sell all its property and discontinue business against the dissent of a
single stockholder. Luehrmann v. Lincoln Trust & Title Co., 192 S.W. 1o26, 1032
(Mo. 1917). Jones v. Bank of Leadville, 10 Colo. 464, 476, 17 Pac. 272, 278
(1887).
See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 2945 (perm. ed. 1950);
Sprecher, The Right of Minority Stockholders to Prevent the Dissolution of a Profit-
able Enterprise, 33 Ky. L.J. i5o (194S); Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory
or Charter Powers Given to Majority Stockholders, 30 MICH. L. REV. 645 (1932);
Berle, Nonvoting Stock and "Bankers' Control," 39 HARV. L. REV. 673 (19z6);
Comments, Sale of All or Substantially All of Corporate Assets-Effect of Modern
Statutes, 45 MICH. L. REV. 341 (x947); Limitations of the Statutory Power of
Majority Stockholders to Dissolve a Corporation, 25 HARv. L. REV. 677 (19.2);
view with liberality the activities of management-except where di-
rectors' actions are ultra vires or fraudulent or oppressive to the minor-
ity-it is well settled that those entrusted with the management of
corporate affairs must exercise the highest degree of trust and good
faith.19  This would seem especially true where one or more classes of
owners are not represented by the board of directors. Thus, when every
stockholder enjoys the right to vote, courts will generally decline to
substitute their judgment for that of the majority, since, presumably,
the interests of the majority will best serve the interests of the corpora-
tion.20 On the other hand, when one or more classes of stockholders
are not represented by the directors, the presumption of good faith
would seem to be attenuated, and, at the instigation of a nonvoting
stockholder, courts tend carefully to evaluate alleged misconduct by the
directors.2 ' Accordingly, it would seem that even though nonvoting
Notes, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 203 (x946); 94 U. PA. L. REV. 412 (1946); 40 H.14L.
L. REV. 944 (1927)i 6 VA. L. REV. 640 (1921); 2 MINN. L. REV. 526 (9-g.).
Cf. Annot, Power of Directors to Sell Property of Corporation Without Consen. of
Stockholders, 6o A.L.R. IzIo (19±8). Also, cf. Note, 30 CAL. L. REV. 338 (1942)
setting forth grounds for rescinding sale.
"Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 195); Otis & Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., 6x F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3rd Cir. 1946),
31 VA. L. REV. 695 (1945); Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 35, reh.
denied, 297 N.Y. 604, 75 N.E.2d 274 (1947), 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1948), 48
COLUM. L. REV. 290 (1948), 33 CORNELL L.Q. 421 (1948), 61 HARV. L. REV.
541 (1948), 31 MARQ. L. REV. 294 (1948), 46 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1948), 23
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 209 (1948), 48 STAN. INTRA. L. REv. 147 (1948), 21 So. CALIF.
L. REV. 403 (1948), 96 U. PA. L. REV. 48 (1948), 57 YALE L.J. 489 (948);
Bayer v. Beron, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (z944); Turner v. American Metal Co., 268 App. Div.
239, 259, 50 N.Y.S.2d Soo, 819 (1944); Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57
N.E.2d 285, reh. denied, 293 N.Y. 859, 59 N.E.2d 446 (944.); Shaw v. Davis,
28 At. 619, 67z (Md. z894): ". • whenever any action of either directors or stock-
holders is relied on .. . for the purpose of invoking the interposition of a court of
equity, if the act complained of be neither ultra vires, fraudulent, nor illegal, the court
will refuse intervention because powerless to grant it, and will leave all such matters
to be disposed of by the majority of the stockholders in such manner as their interest
may dictate, and their action will be binding on all, whether approved by the minority
or not." See BALLENTINE, CORPORAIONS 16o, x6i (rev. ed. 1946); Uhlman, The
Duty of Corporate Directors to Exercise Business Judgment, 2o B.U.L. REV. 488
(194-); Latty, Partial Survey of Minority Shareholder Protection in American Corpo-
ration Law, i J. Bus. L. nio (1957).
"o See note '19 supra.
"Duty of directors: Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 2,26 N.Y. 185, 123
N.E. 148 (zxq9). See Swope, Some Aspects of Corporate Management, 23 HARV.
BUS. REV. 314 (1945); Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1305 (934.) ; Rhodes, Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Mismanagement,
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stockholders are denied direct managerial participation, they are, never-
theless, protected by statute or decision in proprietary matters.22
It would appear, therefore, that the decision of the West Virginia
court in the instant case effectively places a premium upon evasive tech-
niques2s to vest control in a minority group.24 The court remarked that
of Corporations, 3 CALIF. L. REV. 21 (1914)1 Comment, Liability of Corporate Di-
65 U. PA. L. REV. 128 (1916); Lynch, Diligence of Directors in Management
rectors, 17 YALE L.J. 33 (1907). Notes: s U. CHI. L. REV. 668 (1938) ) x6 B.U.L.
REV. 736 (1936); 2o IOWA L. REV. 8o$ (1935); 82 U. PA. L. REV. 364 (1934)
16 MINN. L. REV. 588 (1932)-
Duty of directors and majority stockholders to nonvoting* stockholders: Bates
Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 352, x56 At. 293 (1931). Kidd v. New Hamp-
shire Traction Co., 74 N.H. 17o, 66 Ad. 127 (1907). See BALLANTINE, CORORA-
TIONS z56 (rev. ed. 1946); Berle, Non-voting Stock and "Bankers Control," 39 HAIV.
L. REV. 673 (1926).
Duty of majority stockholders to minority sto ckholders: Geddes v. Anaconda Cop-
per Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (gzi); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.zd 36
(3rd Cir. 1947), 36 CALIF. L. REV. 325 (1948), 33 CORNELL L.Q. 414 (1948),
6* HAv. L. REV. 359 (1948), 41 ILL. L. REV. 122 (1946) (see 63 F. Supp. 243
(D.C. Del. 1945)), 46 MICH. L. REV. o61 (1948), 96 U. PA. L. REV. 276 (1947);
Lebold v. Inland S.S. Co., 82 F.zd 351 (Tth Cir. 1936); Nave-McCord Mercantile
Co. v. Ranney, 29 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1928); Outwater v. Public Service Corp. of
New Jersey, 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 Ad. 729 (x928), aff'd, 104 N.J. Eq. 490, 146
Ad. 9x6 (1929); Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14
Del. Ch. i, 120 Ad. 486 (1923); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., supra;
Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1oo4 (1904). See
Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority
Stockholders, 30 MICH. L. REv. 645 (1932); Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust, 44 H.Av. L. REv. 1049 (1931). Note, 33 YALE LJ. 436 (1924).
Duty of directors to the corporation: See Uhlman, Legal Status of Corporate Di-
rectors, 19 B.U.L. REV. 12 (1939); Dodd, Is Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties of
Corporate Managers Practicable? 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935). Notes, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 219 (1935); 44 YALE L.J. 527 (1935); 83 U. PA. L. REV. 56 (1934);
8 Wis. L. REV. 342 (1933); 45 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1932); 29 COLUM. L. REV. 338
(1929).
"See note 18 supra.
" For example: Where the issuance of nonvoting stock is not permitted, corpora-
tions may accomplish its end result by dividing the class of stock that is to be given
control into small denominations thereby increasing its voting strength. Thus, in a
corporation with $1oo,ooo capital stock, $75,000 class A shares could be given a par
value of $ioo each and thereby 750 votes; the remaining $25,000 class B stock could
then be divided into shares of $25 par value and thereby possess 1ooo votes. Another
device for achieving the same objective is "vote laden" stock, i.e., control by voting
strength disproportionate to investment. Thus, the class A stock could be given one
vote per share, while the class B stock has 7 votes per share. The plan most commonly
used to frustrate the effectiveness of minority representation is to classify the board
of directors and stagger the election of each class. A board comprised of six members
whose term of office is three years may be classified into three groups whereby two
directors are elected each year. This latter device, however, would not achieve the
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nothing in the West Virginia Constitution prohibits stockholders of a
private corporation from waiving their right to vote or from enter-
ing into an express agreement with other stockholders affecting the man-
ner in which they exercise this right.25 The weight of authority sup-
ports this conclusion, even though the obvious purpose of voting con-
trol agreements is to secure or retain control of the corporation in a
select group of stockholders, and even though the consideration may
minority control which is perhaps the most significant feature of both nonvoting
stock and the first Xwo control devices. Nevertheless, it will achieve perpetuation of
management, which is one of the suggested reasons for the rise in prominence of
nonvoting stock. See note i supra.
""Minority stockholder" is used in contradistinction to controlling stockholder,
though in fact, the minority may well represent a majority of the stockholders. Schmid
v. Ballard, 175 Minn. 138, 22o N.W. 423 (1928); Cases cited note is supra. Cf.
Alster v. British Type Investors, 83 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Note, 8 U. CHI.
L. REV. 335 (194').
"96 S.E.2d 171, 18o (W. Va. 1957).
E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harket, z57 Neb. 867, 6z N.W.zd 288 (7954.), 33 NEB.
L. REV. 636; Ringling Bros. B. & B. Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del.
Ch. 610, 53 A.ad 44.1 (1947), 36 CALIF. L. REV. 281 (1948), 6o HA v. L. REV. 651
(1947.), 46 MICH. L. REV. 70 (1947), i5 U. PA. L. REV. 738 (1948), 96 U. PA.
L. REV. 12! ('947); Gumbiner v. Alden Inn, 389 I. 273, 59 N.E.zd 648 ('945).
It is particularly interesting that Illinois has long recognized the validity of such agree-
ments, while expressly prohibiting nonvoting stock. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199
N.E. 641, S BROOKLYN L. REV. 336, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 836, z MINN. L. REV.
103; 13 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 585, 11 ST. JOHNS L. REV. '117; Fitzgerald v. Christy,
242 Ill. App. 343 (x926); Horn v. J.O. Nessen Lumber Co., 236 Ill. App, 187 (1925);
Thompson v.* J.D. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Ill. 54, z16 N.E. 648 (-917) 5 Luthy
v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170, xo N.E. 373 (x9gx); Venner v. Chicago City R. Co., 258 Ill.
523, x1 N.E. 949 (1913); Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 Ill. 589, 73 N.E. 874 (1905);
Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 Ill. 301, 40 N.E. 36z (1895); Faulds v. Yates, 57 IL. 4x6
(1870). See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEIA OF CORPORAVONS, § 2064 (perm. ed. 1952);
BALLANINE, CORPOItAtONS 442, § 189 (rev. ed. 1946); Delaney, The Corporate
Director: Can His Hands Be Tied in Advance, 5o CoLUM. L. REV. Si (95o) ; Com-
ment, Stockholders Control by Agreement, 17 FoRDHAM L. REV. 95 (-948); Annot.,
7! A.LR. 1289 (1930).' Cf. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. z1, 6o N.E.2d
829 (1945) (dictum). Also, cf. Durkee v. People ex rel. Askren 155 Ill. 354, 40
N.E. 626 (1895). An agreement which violates express provisions of the constitution
and statutes relative to the right to vote is void. Some courts, however, apparently take
the view that such agreements are per se invalid as against public policy. Clark v.
First Nat. Bk. of Ottumwa, 219 Iowa 637, 259 N.W. xi (1935) ; Stott v. Stott, 258
Mich. 547, 242 N.W. 747 (1932), i8 IOWA L. REv. 89; Bridges v. Staton, 15o N.C.
zx6, 63 S.E. 892 (1909).
Assuming a valid agreement, courts may award damnages for breach of the agree-
ment, E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harket, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954), or
grant an injunction to prevent conduct not in conformity with, and decree specific
performance of the agreement. Katcher v.-Ohsman, z6 N.J. Super 28, 97 A.ad'iSo
(1953) (agreement enforceable- by- specific performance); Kronenberg v. Sullivan
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consist of the purchase of stock on the faith of a promise of others sim-
ilarly to purchase under the terms of the agreement.2 7 Perhaps the
only limitation is that the agreement must not work a hardship on the
corporation or in any way oppress creditors or other stockholders not
parties to it.28
Stockholders, however, generally may not irrevocably sever by con-
tract the voting rights from stock ownership.' Thus, even though a
County Steam Laundry Co., 91 N.Y.S.zd x44, aff'd, without o., 277 App. Div. 916,
98 N.Y.S.2d 658, motion to resettle denied, 278 App. Div. 726, 103 N.Y.S.2d 66o
(x949) (violation enjoined); Ringling Bros. B. & B. Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ring-
ling, 29 Del. Ch. 61o, S3 A.zd 441 (1947) (votes of stockholder who breached agree-
ment treated as of no effect) ; Martocci v. Martocci, 42 N.Y.S.2d 222, aff'd without
op., 266 App. Div. 840, 43 N.Y.S. 2d 5x6, app. denied, 266 App. Div. 917, 43
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1943) (agreement enforceable by specific performance); Harris v.
Magrell, 131 Misc. 38o, 226 N.Y.S. 621 (1928) (violation of agreement enjoined);
Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 41o, 199 N.E. 641 (1936) (agreement enforceable by
specific performance); Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 II. App. 343 (1926) (violation
of agreement enjoined).
Contra, Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917). Although
holding the particular agreement was invalid as against public policy, the court stated
that even if it was assumed that the contract was valid, a court of equity would not
grant specific performance. The court said to do so would be in effect to have the
court elect the directors, a matter which has historically been within the province of
the stockholders. Gage v. Fisher, S N.D. 297, 6S N.W. 809 (x895). See Annot., 71
A.L.R. 1289 (1930).
"Asher v. Ruppa, 173 F.2d so (7 th Cir. x949); Gray v. Bloomington & Normal
Ry., 120 III. App. 159 (i9o5); Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry. Co., iiS Cal. 584,
47 Pac. 58z (x97). Contra, Johnson v. Spartanburg County Fair Ass'n, 2io S.C.
56, 41 S.E.2d 599 (1947).
SaFord v. Magee, 16o F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.s. 759
(1947); Feich v. Kaufman, 174 Ill. App. 3o6 (x912); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263
N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234, rek. denied, 264 N.Y. 46o, 191 N.E. 514 (1934). An
agreement among a minority in number for the purpose of obtaining control of the
corporation by election is not illegal since stockholders have the right to combine
their interests and voting power to secure control of the corporation. It is only when
such agreements contravene express charter or statutory provisions or contemplate any
fraud, oppression, or wrong against other stockholders or an illegal object, that they
are invalid and not binding upon the parties thereto. Manson .v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313,
tig N.E. S59 (918).
"'Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170, 11o N.E. 373 (9xgs); Gage v. Fisher, 5 N.D. 297,
65 N.W. 8o9 (1895). See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPOlRxTONS, § 2o65 (perm.
ed. x952); Comment, Separation of the Voting Power from Legal and Beneficial
Ownership of Corporate Stock, 47 MICH. L. REv. 547 (x949); Note, 6x HARV. L.
REV. xo62 (1948). Contra, White v. Snell, 35 Utah 434, 1oo Pac. 927 (1909);
Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. S8z (1897) (neither is
it illegal nor against public policy to separate the voting power of the stock from its
ownership). Cf. Winsor v. Commonwealth Coal Co., 63 Wash. 62, 114 Pac. 9o8
(19ii) (statute specifically provided for the separation).
stockholder may enter into a valid contract delegating authority to vote
his stock, he, nevertheless, retains the power to abrogate the agreement
when the delegatee threatens to exercise the vote in a manner inimical
to the stockholder's best interests. 0  Furthermore, it is arguable that a
stockholder who is able contractually to delegate his voting rights in an
arm's-length voting control agreement enjoys a somewhat more favor-
able bargaining position, than one whose right to vote is denied by his
purchase of stock with predetermined rights and privileges.
Voting-control agreements, nevertheless, do not provide the flexibility
in corp orate finance or the complete close stockholder control that non-
voting stock accomplishes. Furthermore, the practical difficulties in-
herent in any attempt to secure such flexibility and control by means of
voting-control agreements, tend to render their use ineffectual in large
and widely-held corporations. Consequently, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia has foreclosed the most effective means of
obtaining corporate financial flexibility and dose stockholder control
that was thought formerly to .exist.
If, then, complete stockholder democracy is a practical impossibility
and if the West Virginia Constitution is sufficiently ambiguous to war-
rant the construction that the vigorous dissent in the instant case
espoused and which the Missouri court, in interpreting its analogous
constitutional provision adopted, the result here is unfortunate.31
Unless a court is bound by dear and unequivocal language, it should
proceed with caution in nullifying a statute upon which extensive busi-
ness practice and expectations have been built 3 2
'
0 Shepang Voting Trust Cases, 6o Conn. 553, 24 Atl. 32 (189o); Warren v. Pim,
66 N.J. Eq. 353, 59 Adt. 773 (1904); Morel v. Hoge, 13o Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487
(19o8); Bridges v. First Nat. Bank, x52 N.C. 293, 67 S.E. 770 (1910).
"i See note 3 supra. The dissenting judge argued first, that the constitutional
provision appeared under the subhead "Rights of Stockholders" and a stockholder has
no rights except those acquired by contract. Secondly, that great deference should be
given past administrative and legislative interpretation of the provision. Finally,
assuming that the provision was intended to guarantee the right to vote to every
stockholder, there was no valid reason why the stockholders could not waive the right.
"The West Virginia Legislature has proposed an amendment to article X1, sec-
tion 4 of the constitution which will provide in part as follows: "The Legislature shall
provide by law that every corporation, . . . shall have power to issue one or more
classes and series within classes of stock, with or without par value, with full, limited
or no voting powers .... " Senate Bill No. 25z.
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